The WHO Pandemic Agreement: A Guide By David Bell, Thi Thuy Van Dinh March 22, 2024 Government, Society 30 minute read The World Health Organization (WHO) and its 194 Member States have been engaged for over two years in the development of two ‘instruments’ or agreements with the intent of radically changing the way pandemics and other health emergencies are managed. One, consisting of draft amendments to the existing International health Regulations (IHR), seeks to change the current IHR non-binding recommendations into requirements or binding recommendations, by having countries “undertake” to implement those given by the WHO in future declared health emergencies. It covers all ‘public health emergencies of international concern’ (PHEIC), with a single person, the WHO Director-General (DG) determining what a PHEIC is, where it extends, and when it ends. It specifies mandated vaccines, border closures, and other directives understood as lockdowns among the requirements the DG can impose. It is discussed further elsewhere and still under negotiation in Geneva. A second document, previously known as the (draft) Pandemic Treaty, then Pandemic Accord, and more recently the Pandemic Agreement, seeks to specify governance, supply chains, and various other interventions aimed at preventing, preparing for, and responding to, pandemics (pandemic prevention, preparedness and response – PPPR). It is currently being negotiated by the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body (INB). Both texts will be subject to a vote at the May 2024 World Health Assembly (WHA) in Geneva, Switzerland. These votes are intended, by those promoting these projects, to bring governance of future multi-country healthcare emergencies (or threats thereof) under the WHO umbrella. The latest version of the draft Pandemic Agreement (here forth the ‘Agreement’) was released on 7th March 2024. However, it is still being negotiated by various committees comprising representatives of Member States and other interested entities. It has been through multiple iterations over two years, and looks like it. With the teeth of the pandemic response proposals in the IHR, the Agreement looks increasingly irrelevant, or at least unsure of its purpose, picking up bits and pieces in a half-hearted way that the IHR amendments do not, or cannot, include. However, as discussed below, it is far from irrelevant. Historical Perspective These aim to increase the centralization of decision-making within the WHO as the “directing and coordinating authority.” This terminology comes from the WHO’s 1946 Constitution, developed in the aftermath of the Second World War as the world faced the outcomes of European fascism and the similar approaches widely imposed through colonialist regimes. The WHO would support emerging countries, with rapidly expanding and poorly resourced populations struggling under high disease burdens, and coordinate some areas of international support as these sovereign countries requested it. The emphasis of action was on coordinating rather than directing. In the 80 years prior to the WHO’s existence, international public health had grown within a more directive mindset, with a series of meetings by colonial and slave-owning powers from 1851 to manage pandemics, culminating in the inauguration of the Office Internationale d’Hygiene Publique in Paris in 1907, and later the League of Nations Health Office. World powers imposed health dictates on those less powerful, in other parts of the world and increasingly on their own population through the eugenics movement and similar approaches. Public health would direct, for the greater good, as a tool of those who wish to direct the lives of others. The WHO, governed by the WHA, was to be very different. Newly independent States and their former colonial masters were ostensibly on an equal footing within the WHA (one country – one vote), and the WHO’s work overall was to be an example of how human rights could dominate the way society works. The model for international public health, as exemplified in the Declaration of Alma Ata in 1978, was to be horizontal rather than vertical, with communities and countries in the driving seat. With the evolution of the WHO in recent decades from a core funding model (countries give money, the WHO decides under the WHA guidance how to spend it) to a model based on specified funding (funders, both public and increasingly private, instruct the WHO on how to spend it), the WHO has inevitably changed to become a public-private partnership required to serve the interests of funders rather than populations. As most funding comes from a few countries with major Pharma industrial bases, or private investors and corporations in the same industry, the WHO has been required to emphasize the use of pharmaceuticals and downplay evidence and knowledge where these clash (if it wants to keep all its staff funded). It is helpful to view the draft Agreement, and the IHR amendments, in this context. Why May 2024? The WHO, together with the World Bank, G20, and other institutions have been emphasizing the urgency of putting the new pandemic instruments in place earnestly, before the ‘next pandemic.’ This is based on claims that the world was unprepared for Covid-19, and that the economic and health harm would be somehow avoidable if we had these agreements in place. They emphasize, contrary to evidence that Covid-19 virus (SARS-CoV-2) origins involve laboratory manipulation, that the main threats we face are natural, and that these are increasing exponentially and present an “existential” threat to humanity. The data on which the WHO, the World Bank, and G20 base these claims demonstrates the contrary, with reported natural outbreaks having increased as detection technologies have developed, but reducing in mortality rate, and in numbers, over the past 10 to 20 years.. A paper cited by the World Bank to justify urgency and quoted as suggesting a 3x increase in risk in the coming decade actually suggests that a Covid-19-like event would occur roughly every 129 years, and a Spanish-flu repetition every 292 to 877 years. Such predictions are unable to take into account the rapidly changing nature of medicine and improved sanitation and nutrition (most deaths from Spanish flu would not have occurred if modern antibiotics had been available), and so may still overestimate risk. Similarly, the WHO’s own priority disease list for new outbreaks only includes two diseases of proven natural origin that have over 1,000 historical deaths attributed to them. It is well demonstrated that the risk and expected burden of pandemics is misrepresented by major international agencies in current discussions. The urgency for May 2024 is clearly therefore inadequately supported, firstly because neither the WHO nor others have demonstrated how the harms accrued through Covid-19 would be reduced through the measures proposed, and secondly because the burden and risk is misrepresented. In this context, the state of the Agreement is clearly not where it should be as a draft international legally binding agreement intended to impose considerable financial and other obligations on States and populations. This is particularly problematic as the proposed expenditure; the proposed budget is over $31 billion per year, with over $10 billion more on other One Health activities. Much of this will have to be diverted from addressing other diseases burdens that impose far greater burden. This trade-off, essential to understand in public health policy development, has not yet been clearly addressed by the WHO. The WHO DG stated recently that the WHO does not want the power to impose vaccine mandates or lockdowns on anyone, and does not want this. This begs the question of why either of the current WHO pandemic instruments is being proposed, both as legally binding documents. The current IHR (2005) already sets out such approaches as recommendations the DG can make, and there is nothing non-mandatory that countries cannot do now without pushing new treaty-like mechanisms through a vote in Geneva. Based on the DG’s claims, they are essentially redundant, and what new non-mandatory clauses they contain, as set out below, are certainly not urgent. Clauses that are mandatory (Member States “shall”) must be considered within national decision-making contexts and appear against the WHO’s stated intent. Common sense would suggest that the Agreement, and the accompanying IHR amendments, be properly thought through before Member States commit. The WHO has already abandoned the legal requirement for a 4-month review time for the IHR amendments (Article 55.2 IHR), which are also still under negotiation just 2 months before the WHA deadline. The Agreement should also have at least such a period for States to properly consider whether to agree – treaties normally take many years to develop and negotiate and no valid arguments have been put forward as to why these should be different. The Covid-19 response resulted in an unprecedented transfer of wealth from those of lower income to the very wealthy few, completely contrary to the way in which the WHO was intended to affect human society. A considerable portion of these pandemic profits went to current sponsors of the WHO, and these same corporate entities and investors are set to further benefit from the new pandemic agreements. As written, the Pandemic Agreement risks entrenching such centralization and profit-taking, and the accompanying unprecedented restrictions on human rights and freedoms, as a public health norm. To continue with a clearly flawed agreement simply because of a previously set deadline, when no clear population benefit is articulated and no true urgency demonstrated, would therefore be a major step backward in international public health. Basic principles of proportionality, human agency, and community empowerment, essential for health and human rights outcomes, are missing or paid lip-service. The WHO clearly wishes to increase its funding and show it is ‘doing something,’ but must first articulate why the voluntary provisions of the current IHR are insufficient. It is hoped that by systematically reviewing some key clauses of the agreement here, it will become clear why a rethink of the whole approach is necessary. The full text is found below. The commentary below concentrates on selected draft provisions of the latest publicly available version of the draft agreement that seem to be unclear or potentially problematic. Much of the remaining text is essentially pointless as it reiterates vague intentions to be found in other documents or activities which countries normally undertake in the course of running health services, and have no place in a focused legally-binding international agreement. REVISED Draft of the negotiating text of the WHO Pandemic Agreement. 7th March, 2024 Preamble Recognizing that the World Health Organization…is the directing and coordinating authority on international health work. This is inconsistent with a recent statement by the WHO DG that the WHO has no interest or intent to direct country health responses. To reiterate it here suggests that the DG is not representing the true position regarding the Agreement. “Directing authority” is however in line with the proposed IHR Amendments (and the WHO’s Constitution), under which countries will “undertake” ahead of time to follow the DG’s recommendations (which thereby become instructions). As the HR amendments make clear, this is intended to apply even to a perceived threat rather than actual harm. Recalling the constitution of the World Health Organization…highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition. This statement recalls fundamental understandings of public health, and is of importance here as it raises the question of why the WHO did not strongly condemn prolonged school closures, workplace closures, and other impoverishing policies during the Covid-19 response. In 2019, WHO made clear that these dangers should prevent actions we now call ‘lockdowns’ from being imposed. Deeply concerned by the gross inequities at national and international levels that hindered timely and equitable access to medical and other Covid-19 pandemic-related products, and the serious shortcomings in pandemic preparedness. In terms of health equity (as distinct from commodity of ‘vaccine’ equity), inequity in the Covid-19 response was not in failing to provide a vaccine against former variants to immune, young people in low-income countries who were at far higher risk from endemic diseases, but in the disproportionate harm to them of uniformly-imposed NPIs that reduced current and future income and basic healthcare, as was noted by the WHO in 2019 Pandemic Influenza recommendations. The failure of the text to recognize this suggests that lessons from Covid-19 have not informed this draft Agreement. The WHO has not yet demonstrated how pandemic ‘preparedness,’ in the terms they use below, would have reduced impact, given that there is poor correlation between strictness or speed of response and eventual outcomes. Reiterating the need to work towards…an equitable approach to mitigate the risk that pandemics exacerbate existing inequities in access to health services, As above – in the past century, the issue of inequity has been most pronounced in pandemic response, rather than the impact of the virus itself (excluding the physiological variation in risk). Most recorded deaths from acute pandemics, since the Spanish flu, were during Covid-19, in which the virus hit mainly sick elderly, but response impacted working-age adults and children heavily and will continue to have effect, due to increased poverty and debt; reduced education and child marriage, in future generations. These have disproportionately affected lower-income people, and particularly women. The lack of recognition of this in this document, though they are recognized by the World Bank and UN agencies elsewhere, must raise real questions on whether this Agreement has been thoroughly thought through, and the process of development been sufficiently inclusive and objective. Chapter I. Introduction Article 1. Use of terms (i) “pathogen with pandemic potential” means any pathogen that has been identified to infect a human and that is: novel (not yet characterized) or known (including a variant of a known pathogen), potentially highly transmissible and/or highly virulent with the potential to cause a public health emergency of international concern. This provides a very wide scope to alter provisions. Any pathogen that can infect humans and is potentially highly transmissible or virulent, though yet uncharacterized means virtually any coronavirus, influenza virus, or a plethora of other relatively common pathogen groups. The IHR Amendments intend that the DG alone can make this call, over the advice of others, as occurred with monkeypox in 2022. (j) “persons in vulnerable situations” means individuals, groups or communities with a disproportionate increased risk of infection, severity, disease or mortality. This is a good definition – in Covid-19 context, would mean the sick elderly, and so is relevant to targeting a response. “Universal health coverage” means that all people have access to the full range of quality health services they need, when and where they need them, without financial hardship. While the general UHC concept is good, it is time a sensible (rather than patently silly) definition was adopted. Society cannot afford the full range of possible interventions and remedies for all, and clearly there is a scale of cost vs benefit that prioritizes certain ones over others. Sensible definitions make action more likely, and inaction harder to justify. One could argue that none should have the full range until all have good basic care, but clearly the earth will not support ‘the full range’ for 8 billion people. Article 2. Objective This Agreement is specifically for pandemics (a poorly defined term but essentially a pathogen that spreads rapidly across national borders). In contrast, the IHR amendments accompanying it are broader in scope – for any public health emergencies of international concern. Article 3. Principles 2. the sovereign right of States to adopt, legislate and implement legislation The amendments to the IHR require States to undertake to follow WHO instructions ahead of time, before such instruction and context are known. These two documents must be understood, as noted later in the Agreement draft, as complementary. 3. equity as the goal and outcome of pandemic prevention, preparedness and response, ensuring the absence of unfair, avoidable or remediable differences among groups of people. This definition of equity here needs clarification. In the pandemic context, the WHO emphasized commodity (vaccine) equity during the Covid-19 response. Elimination of differences implied equal access to Covid-19 vaccines in countries with large aging, obese highly vulnerable populations (e.g. the USA or Italy), and those with young populations at minimal risk and with far more pressing health priorities (e.g. Niger or Uganda). Alternatively, but equally damaging, equal access to different age groups within a country when the risk-benefit ratio is clearly greatly different. This promotes worse health outcomes by diverting resources from where they are most useful, as it ignores heterogeneity of risk. Again, an adult approach is required in international agreements, rather than feel-good sentences, if they are going to have a positive impact. 5. …a more equitable and better prepared world to prevent, respond to and recover from pandemics As with ‘3’ above, this raises a fundamental problem: What if health equity demands that some populations divert resources to childhood nutrition and endemic diseases rather than the latest pandemic, as these are likely of far higher burden to many younger but lower-income populations? This would not be equity in the definition implied here, but would clearly lead to better and more equal health outcomes. The WHO must decide whether it is about uniform action, or minimizing poor health, as these are clearly very different. They are the difference between the WHO’s commodity equity, and true health equity. Chapter II. The world together equitably: achieving equity in, for and through pandemic prevention, preparedness and response Equity in health should imply a reasonably equal chance of overcoming or avoiding preventable sickness. The vast majority of sickness and death is due to either non-communicable diseases often related to lifestyle, such as obesity and type 2 diabetes mellitus, undernutrition in childhood, and endemic infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, malaria, and HIV/AIDS. Achieving health equity would primarily mean addressing these. In this chapter of the draft Pandemic Agreement, equity is used to imply equal access to specific health commodities, particularly vaccines, for intermittent health emergencies, although these exert a small fraction of the burden of other diseases. It is, specifically, commodity-equity, and not geared to equalizing overall health burden but to enabling centrally-coordinated homogenous responses to unusual events. Article 4. Pandemic prevention and surveillance 2. The Parties shall undertake to cooperate: (b) in support of…initiatives aimed at preventing pandemics, in particular those that improve surveillance, early warning and risk assessment; .…and identify settings and activities presenting a risk of emergence and re-emergence of pathogens with pandemic potential. (c-h) [Paragraphs on water and sanitation, infection control, strengthening of biosafety, surveillance and prevention of vector-born diseases, and addressing antimicrobial resistance.] The WHO intends the Agreement to have force under international law. Therefore, countries are undertaking to put themselves under force of international law in regards to complying with the agreement’s stipulations. The provisions under this long article mostly cover general health stuff that countries try to do anyway. The difference will be that countries will be assessed on progress. Assessment can be fine if in context, less fine if it consists of entitled ‘experts’ from wealthy countries with little local knowledge or context. Perhaps such compliance is best left to national authorities, who are more in use with local needs and priorities. The justification for the international bureaucracy being built to support this, while fun for those involved, is unclear and will divert resources from actual health work. 6. The Conference of the Parties may adopt, as necessary, guidelines, recommendations and standards, including in relation to pandemic prevention capacities, to support the implementation of this Article. Here and later, the COP is invoked as a vehicle to decide on what will actually be done. The rules are explained later (Articles 21-23). While allowing more time is sensible, it begs the question of why it is not better to wait and discuss what is needed in the current INB process, before committing to a legally-binding agreement. This current article says nothing not already covered by the IHR2005 or other ongoing programs. Article 5. One Health approach to pandemic prevention, preparedness and response Nothing specific or new in this article. It seems redundant (it is advocating a holistic approach mentioned elsewhere) and so presumably is just to get the term ‘One Health’ into the agreement. (One could ask, why bother?) Some mainstream definitions of One Health (e.g. Lancet) consider that it means non-human species are on a par with humans in terms of rights and importance. If this is meant here, clearly most Member States would disagree. So we may assume that it is just words to keep someone happy (a little childish in an international document, but the term ‘One Health’ has been trending, like ‘equity,’ as if the concept of holistic approaches to public health were new). Article 6. Preparedness, health system resilience and recovery 2. Each Party commits…[to] : (a) routine and essential health services during pandemics with a focus on primary health care, routine immunization and mental health care, and with particular attention to persons in vulnerable situations (b) developing, strengthening and maintaining health infrastructure (c) developing post-pandemic health system recovery strategies (d) developing, strengthening and maintaining: health information systems This is good, and (a) seems to require avoidance of lockdowns (which inevitably cause the harms listed). Unfortunately other WHO documents lead one to assume this is not the intent…It does appear therefore that this is simply another list of fairly non-specific feel-good measures that have no useful place in a new legally-binding agreement, and which most countries are already undertaking. (e) promoting the use of social and behavioural sciences, risk communication and community engagement for pandemic prevention, preparedness and response. This requires clarification, as the use of behavioral science during the Covid-19 response involved deliberate inducement of fear to promote behaviors that people would not otherwise follow (e.g. Spi-B). It is essential here that the document clarifies how behavioral science should be used ethically in healthcare. Otherwise, this is also a quite meaningless provision. Article 7. Health and care workforce This long Article discusses health workforce, training, retention, non-discrimination, stigma, bias, adequate remuneration, and other standard provisions for workplaces. It is unclear why it is included in a legally binding pandemic agreement, except for: 4. [The Parties]…shall invest in establishing, sustaining, coordinating and mobilizing a skilled and trained multidisciplinary global public health emergency workforce…Parties having established emergency health teams should inform WHO thereof and make best efforts to respond to requests for deployment… Emergency health teams established (within capacity etc.) – are something countries already do, when they have capacity. There is no reason to have this as a legally-binding instrument, and clearly no urgency to do so. Article 8. Preparedness monitoring and functional reviews 1. The Parties shall, building on existing and relevant tools, develop and implement an inclusive, transparent, effective and efficient pandemic prevention, preparedness and response monitoring and evaluation system. 2. Each Party shall assess, every five years, with technical support from the WHO Secretariat upon request, the functioning and readiness of, and gaps in, its pandemic prevention, preparedness and response capacity, based on the relevant tools and guidelines developed by WHO in partnership with relevant organizations at international, regional and sub-regional levels. Note that this is being required of countries that are already struggling to implement monitoring systems for major endemic diseases, including tuberculosis, malaria, HIV, and nutritional deficiencies. They will be legally bound to divert resources to pandemic prevention. While there is some overlap, it will inevitably divert resources from currently underfunded programs for diseases of far higher local burdens, and so (not theoretically, but inevitably) raise mortality. Poor countries are being required to put resources into problems deemed significant by richer countries. Article 9. Research and development Various general provisions about undertaking background research that countries are generally doing anyway, but with an ’emerging disease’ slant. Again, the INB fails to justify why this diversion of resources from researching greater disease burdens should occur in all countries (why not just those with excess resources?). Article 10. Sustainable and geographically diversified production Mostly non-binding but suggested cooperation on making pandemic-related products available, including support for manufacturing in “inter-pandemic times” (a fascinating rendering of ‘normal’), when they would only be viable through subsidies. Much of this is probably unimplementable, as it would not be practical to maintain facilities in most or all countries on stand-by for rare events, at cost of resources otherwise useful for other priorities. The desire to increase production in ‘developing’ countries will face major barriers and costs in terms of maintaining quality of production, particularly as many products will have limited use outside of rare outbreak situations. Article 11. Transfer of technology and know-how This article, always problematic for large pharmaceutical corporations sponsoring much WHO outbreak activities, is now watered down to weak requirements to ‘consider,’ promote,’ provide, within capabilities’ etc. Article 12. Access and benefit sharing This Article is intended to establish the WHO Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing System (PABS System). PABS is intended to “ensure rapid, systematic and timely access to biological materials of pathogens with pandemic potential and the genetic sequence data.” This system is of potential high relevance and needs to be interpreted in the context that SARS-CoV-2, the pathogen causing the recent Covid-19 outbreak, was highly likely to have escaped from a laboratory. PABS is intended to expand the laboratory storage, transport, and handling of such viruses, under the oversight of the WHO, an organization outside of national jurisdiction with no significant direct experience in handling biological materials. 3. When a Party has access to a pathogen [it shall]: (a) share with WHO any pathogen sequence information as soon as it is available to the Party; (b) as soon as biological materials are available to the Party, provide the materials to one or more laboratories and/or biorepositories participating in WHO-coordinated laboratory networks (CLNs), Subsequent clauses state that benefits will be shared, and seek to prevent recipient laboratories from patenting materials received from other countries. This has been a major concern of low-and middle-income countries previously, who perceive that institutions in wealthy countries patent and benefit from materials derived from less-wealthy populations. It remains to be seen whether provisions here will be sufficient to address this. The article then becomes yet more concerning: 6. WHO shall conclude legally binding standard PABS contracts with manufacturers to provide the following, taking into account the size, nature and capacities of the manufacturer: (a) annual monetary contributions to support the PABS System and relevant capacities in countries; the determination of the annual amount, use, and approach for monitoring and accountability, shall be finalized by the Parties; (b) real-time contributions of relevant diagnostics, therapeutics or vaccines produced by the manufacturer, 10% free of charge and 10% at not-for-profit prices during public health emergencies of international concern or pandemics, … It is clearly intended that the WHO becomes directly involved in setting up legally binding manufacturing contracts, despite the WHO being outside of national jurisdictional oversight, within the territories of Member States. The PABS system, and therefore its staff and dependent entities, are also to be supported in part by funds from the manufacturers whom they are supposed to be managing. The income of the organization will be dependent on maintaining positive relationships with these private entities in a similar way in which many national regulatory agencies are dependent upon funds from pharmaceutical companies whom their staff ostensibly regulate. In this case, the regulator will be even further removed from public oversight. The clause on 10% (why 10?) products being free of charge, and similar at cost, while ensuring lower-priced commodities irrespective of actual need (the outbreak may be confined to wealthy countries). The same entity, the WHO, will determine whether the triggering emergency exists, determine the response, and manage the contracts to provide the commodities, without direct jurisdictional oversight regarding the potential for corruption or conflict of interest. It is a remarkable system to suggest, irrespective of political or regulatory environment. 8. The Parties shall cooperate…public financing of research and development, prepurchase agreements, or regulatory procedures, to encourage and facilitate as many manufacturers as possible to enter into standard PABS contracts as early as possible. The article envisions that public funding will be used to build the process, ensuring essentially no-risk private profit. 10. To support operationalization of the PABS System, WHO shall…make such contracts public, while respecting commercial confidentiality. The public may know whom contracts are made with, but not all details of the contracts. There will therefore be no independent oversight of the clauses agreed between the WHO, a body outside of national jurisdiction and dependent of commercial companies for funding some of its work and salaries, and these same companies, on ‘needs’ that the WHO itself will have sole authority, under the proposed amendments to the IHR, to determine. The Article further states that the WHO shall use its own product regulatory system (prequalification) and Emergency Use Listing Procedure to open and stimulate markets for the manufacturers of these products. It is doubtful that any national government could make such an overall agreement, yet in May 2024 they will be voting to provide this to what is essentially a foreign, and partly privately financed, entity. Article 13. Supply chain and logistics The WHO will become convenor of a ‘Global Supply Chain and Logistics Network’ for commercially-produced products, to be supplied under WHO contracts when and where the WHO determines, whilst also having the role of ensuring safety of such products. Having mutual support coordinated between countries is good. Having this run by an organization that is significantly funded directly by those gaining from the sale of these same commodities seems reckless and counterintuitive. Few countries would allow this (or at least plan for it). For this to occur safely, the WHO would logically have to forgo all private investment, and greatly restrict national specified funding contributions. Otherwise, the conflicts of interest involved would destroy confidence in the system. There is no suggestion of such divestment from the WHO, but rather, as in Article 12, private sector dependency, directly tied to contracts, will increase. Article 13bis: National procurement- and distribution-related provisions While suffering the same (perhaps unavoidable) issues regarding commercial confidentiality, this alternate Article 13 seems far more appropriate, keeping commercial issues under national jurisdiction and avoiding the obvious conflict of interests that underpin funding for WHO activities and staffing. Article 14. Regulatory systems strengthening This entire Article reflects initiatives and programs already in place. Nothing here appears likely to add to current effort. Article 15. Liability and compensation management 1. Each Party shall consider developing, as necessary and in accordance with applicable law, national strategies for managing liability in its territory related to pandemic vaccines…no-fault compensation mechanisms… 2. The Parties…shall develop recommendations for the establishment and implementation of national, regional and/or global no-fault compensation mechanisms and strategies for managing liability during pandemic emergencies, including with regard to individuals that are in a humanitarian setting or vulnerable situations. This is quite remarkable, but also reflects some national legislation, in removing any fault or liability specifically from vaccine manufacturers, for harms done in pushing out vaccines to the public. During the Covid-19 response, genetic therapeutics being developed by BioNtech and Moderna were reclassified as vaccines, on the basis that an immune response is stimulated after they have modified intracellular biochemical pathways as a medicine normally does. This enabled specific trials normally required for carcinogenicity and teratogenicity to be bypassed, despite raised fetal abnormality rates in animal trials. It will enable the CEPI 100-day vaccine program, supported with private funding to support private mRNA vaccine manufacturers, to proceed without any risk to the manufacturer should there be subsequent public harm. Together with an earlier provision on public funding of research and manufacturing readiness, and the removal of former wording requiring intellectual property sharing in Article 11, this ensures vaccine manufacturers and their investors make profit in effective absence of risk. These entities are currently heavily invested in support for WHO, and were strongly aligned with the introduction of newly restrictive outbreak responses that emphasized and sometimes mandated their products during the Covid-19 outbreak. Article 16. International collaboration and cooperation A somewhat pointless article. It suggests that countries cooperate with each other and the WHO to implement the other agreements in the Agreement. Article 17. Whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches A list of essentially motherhood provisions related to planning for a pandemic. However, countries will legally be required to maintain a ‘national coordination multisectoral body’ for PPPR. This will essentially be an added burden on budgets, and inevitably divert further resources from other priorities. Perhaps just strengthening current infectious disease and nutritional programs would be more impactful. (Nowhere in this Agreement is nutrition discussed (essential for resilience to pathogens) and minimal wording is included on sanitation and clean water (other major reasons for reduction in infectious disease mortality over past centuries). However, the ‘community ownership’ wording is interesting (“empower and enable community ownership of, and contribution to, community readiness for and resilience [for PPPR]”), as this directly contradicts much of the rest of the Agreement, including the centralization of control under the Conference of Parties, requirements for countries to allocate resources to pandemic preparedness over other community priorities, and the idea of inspecting and assessing adherence to the centralized requirements of the Agreement. Either much of the rest of the Agreement is redundant, or this wording is purely for appearance and not to be followed (and therefore should be removed). Article 18. Communication and public awareness 1. Each Party shall promote timely access to credible and evidence-based information …with the aim of countering and addressing misinformation or disinformation… 2. The Parties shall, as appropriate, promote and/or conduct research and inform policies on factors that hinder or strengthen adherence to public health and social measures in a pandemic, as well as trust in science and public health institutions and agencies. The key word is as appropriate, given that many agencies, including the WHO, have overseen or aided policies during the Covid-19 response that have greatly increased poverty, child marriage, teenage pregnancy, and education loss. As the WHO has been shown to be significantly misrepresenting pandemic risk in the process of advocating for this Agreement and related instruments, its own communications would also fall outside the provision here related to evidence-based information, and fall within normal understandings of misinformation. It could not therefore be an arbiter of correctness of information here, so the Article is not implementable. Rewritten to recommend accurate evidence-based information being promoted, it would make good sense, but this is not an issue requiring a legally binding international agreement. Article 19. Implementation and support 3. The WHO Secretariat…organize the technical and financial assistance necessary to address such gaps and needs in implementing the commitments agreed upon under the Pandemic Agreement and the International Health Regulations (2005). As the WHO is dependent on donor support, its ability to address gaps in funding within Member States is clearly not something it can guarantee. The purpose of this article is unclear, repeating in paragraphs 1 and 2 the earlier intent for countries to generally support each other. Article 20. Sustainable financing 1. The Parties commit to working together…In this regard, each Party, within the means and resources at its disposal, shall: (a) prioritize and maintain or increase, as necessary, domestic funding for pandemic prevention, preparedness and response, without undermining other domestic public health priorities including for: (i) strengthening and sustaining capacities for the prevention, preparedness and response to health emergencies and pandemics, in particular the core capacities of the International Health Regulations (2005);… This is silly wording, as countries obviously have to prioritize within budgets, so that moving funds to one area means removing from another. The essence of public health policy is weighing and making such decisions; this reality seems to be ignored here through wishful thinking. (a) is clearly redundant, as the IHR (2005) already exists and countries have agreed to support it. 3. A Coordinating Financial Mechanism (the “Mechanism”) is hereby established to support the implementation of both the WHO Pandemic Agreement and the International Health Regulations (2005) This will be in parallel to the Pandemic Fund recently commenced by the World Bank – an issue not lost on INB delegates and so likely to change here in the final version. It will also be additive to the Global Fund to fight AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, and other health financing mechanisms, and so require another parallel international bureaucracy, presumably based in Geneva. It is intended to have its own capacity to “conduct relevant analyses on needs and gaps, in addition to tracking cooperation efforts,” so it will not be a small undertaking. Chapter III. Institutional and final provisions Article 21. Conference of the Parties 1. A Conference of the Parties is hereby established. 2. The Conference of the Parties shall keep under regular review, every three years, the implementation of the WHO Pandemic Agreement and take the decisions necessary to promote its effective implementation. This sets up the governing body to oversee this Agreement (another body requiring a secretariat and support). It is intended to meet within a year of the Agreement coming into force, and then set its own rules on meeting thereafter. It is likely that many provisions outlined in this draft of the Agreement will be deferred to the COP for further discussion. Articles 22 – 37 These articles cover the functioning of the Conference of Parties (COP) and various administrative issues. Of note, ‘block votes’ will be allowed from regional bodies (e.g. the EU). The WHO will provide the secretariat. Under Article 24 is noted: 3. Nothing in the WHO Pandemic Agreement shall be interpreted as providing the Secretariat of the World Health Organization, including the WHO Director-General, any authority to direct, order, alter or otherwise prescribe the domestic laws or policies of any Party, or to mandate or otherwise impose any requirements that Parties take specific actions, such as ban or accept travellers, impose vaccination mandates or therapeutic or diagnostic measures, or implement lockdowns. These provisions are explicitly stated in the proposed amendments to the IHR, to be considered alongside this agreement. Article 26 notes that the IHR is to be interpreted as compatible, thereby confirming that the IHR provisions including border closures and limits on freedom of movement, mandated vaccination, and other lockdown measures are not negated by this statement. As Article 26 states: “The Parties recognize that the WHO Pandemic Agreement and the International Health Regulations should be interpreted so as to be compatible.” Some would consider this subterfuge – The Director-General recently labeled as liars those who claimed the Agreement included these powers, whilst failing to acknowledge the accompanying IHR amendments. The WHO could do better in avoiding misleading messaging, especially when this involves denigration of the public. Article 32 (Withdrawal) requires that, once adopted, Parties cannot withdraw for a total of 3 years (giving notice after a minimum of 2 years). Financial obligations undertaken under the agreement continue beyond that time. Finally, the Agreement will come into force, assuming a two-thirds majority in the WHA is achieved (Article 19, WHO Constitution), 30 days after the fortieth country has ratified it. Further reading: WHO Pandemic Agreement Intergovernmental Negotiating Board website: https://inb.who.int/ International Health Regulations Working Group website: https://apps.who.int/gb/wgihr/index.html On background to the WHO texts: Amendments to WHO’s International Health Regulations: An Annotated Guide An Unofficial Q&A on International Health Regulations On urgency and burden of pandemics: https://essl.leeds.ac.uk/downloads/download/228/rational-policy-over-panic Disease X and Davos: This is Not the Way to Evaluate and Formulate Public Health Policy Before Preparing for Pandemics, We Need Better Evidence of Risk Revised Draft of the negotiating text of the WHO Pandemic Agreement: Published under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License For reprints, please set the canonical link back to the original Brownstone Institute Article and Author. Authors David Bell David Bell, Senior Scholar at Brownstone Institute, is a public health physician and biotech consultant in global health. He is a former medical officer and scientist at the World Health Organization (WHO), Programme Head for malaria and febrile diseases at the Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics (FIND) in Geneva, Switzerland, and Director of Global Health Technologies at Intellectual Ventures Global Good Fund in Bellevue, WA, USA. View all posts Thi Thuy Van Dinh Dr. Thi Thuy Van Dinh (LLM, PhD) worked on international law in the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Subsequently, she managed multilateral organization partnerships for Intellectual Ventures Global Good Fund and led environmental health technology development efforts for low-resource settings. View all posts Your financial backing of Brownstone Institute goes to support writers, lawyers, scientists, economists, and other people of courage who have been professionally purged and displaced during the upheaval of our times. You can help get the truth out through their ongoing work. https://brownstone.org/articles/the-who-pandemic-agreement-a-guide/ https://www.minds.com/donshafi911/blog/the-who-pandemic-agreement-a-guide-1621719398509187077

Virology - The Damning Evidence The Stake In The Heart For This Pseudoscientific Profession dpl Introduction One never realize how big the task of writing on a subject is until you start. One thing you can be assured of is how much you learn by writing about your findings or thoughts. My stance on virology has been clarified in two previous posts as follows: The Gatekeepers Club. Virus Lie - The Result of 4 Years of Study. Another thing you quickly realize on this journey is how easy it is to censor someone, especially if you start hitting a nerve. I have documented some of it underneath the conclusion of the The Gatekeepers Club article. It is very important to make copies of your work, as shadow banning is one thing, but if these platforms decide to terminate your channel and all the work you have done is on it, you will obviously lose it all. We were in that same position about a year ago when Discord decided to terminate our channel. Twenty of the smartest people you would ever know had been working on it for close to two years, and it was gone overnight. Therefore, this post will serve as safekeeping for some of the best information that I have come across in the last few weeks proving that virology is pseudoscience. Update - 18 September 2023 The order of the sections of this article has been rearranged to introduce the most important information first. As mentioned in my most recent article titled: Hacking at the Root of the Virus Issue it was explained that for the longest time I thought that failure to “isolate” viruses was the most important evidence to focus on. This is however not the case as explained in detail in the “Hacking at the Root of the Virus Issue” article. Transmission is the fundamental assumption on which virology rest. Without proof of transmission, nothing downstream matters. Even though understanding these downstream concepts will never be a waste of time one must consider that the normal man on the street will not be interested in complicated terminology and processes. It is of crucial importance for the no virus community to find easier ways to explain the fallacy that is virology. Seeing as no one need a laboratory to assess whether transmission is possible and because we can observe this phenomena ourselves (Inductive reasoning) this is the linchpin for virology. A twitter space where we discussed this can be viewed here (*Note: Jamie was cut off during his talk and his section was not included). As discussed during the twitter space, we have reviewed the available transmission studies and a summary of these studies can be seen below. Transmission / Infection One of the funniest things you will see while debating the trolls on Twitter is that they will provide studies conducted to prove the efficacy of vaccines. The people that undertake these studies assume that transmission or infection has already been proven, but nothing could be further from the truth. That is why it is important for us to list the peer-reviewed studies that disprove transmission or infection to further demonstrate that virology is a pseudoscience. The list of studies was compiled with the help of Jamie, georgie&donny, and Aldhissla (also see Aldhissla’s list on polio here). (*Please note that this section is open to comments at the moment and anyone that want to add notes or studies are free to leave a comment). The Journal of Infectious Diseases, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Mar. 1, 1905): - Chapman, 1801: Tried to transmit measles using the blood, tears, the mucus of the nostrils and bronchia, and the eruptive matter in the cuticle without any success. - Willan, 1809: Inoculated three children with vesicle fluids of measles but without success. - Albers, 1834: Attempted to infect four children with measles without success. He quoted Alexander Monro, Bourgois, and Spray as also having made unsuccessful inoculations with saliva, tears, and cutaneous scales. - Themmen, 1817: Tried to infect 5 children with measles. 0/5 children became sick. Charles Creighton, 1837 (A history of epidemics in Britain). "No proof of the existence of any contagious principles by which it was propagated from one individual to another." EH Ackernecht, writing about Anticontagionism between 1821 and 1867 - “That the anticontagionists were usually honest men and in deadly earnest is shown, among other things, by the numerous self-experiments to which they submitted themselves to prove their contentions.” also see “Famous are the plague self-experiments of Clot-Bey, the offers for plague self-experiment by Chervin, Lassis, Costa, Lapis, and Lasserre, and the cholera self-experiments of Fay, Scipio Pinel, Wayrot, and J.L. Guyon. The amazing thing is that almost all of these experiments failed to produce the disease.” Note on Hospitals by Florence Nightingale, 1858 - "Suffice it to say, that in the ordinary sense of the word, there is no proof, such as would be admitted in any scientific inquiry, that there is any such thing as 'contagion." also see "Just as there is no such thing as 'contagion,' there is no such thing as inevitable 'infection." Andreas Christian Bull, 1868 - “It does not seem apparent in this small [polio] epidemic that contagion played any role, because the disease occurred here and there in the different places of the district without the possibility of establishing any relation between the various cases or the families of the same.” Karl-Oskar Medin, 1887 - A Swedish pediatrician who was the first to examine a polio outbreak, concluded that it was an infectious, but not contagious, disease. Charles Caverly, 1894 - Investigated the first US polio epidemic: ”it is very certain that it was non-contagious.” Journal of American Medical Association, Volume 72, Number 3, 1919 (or additional link here): - Warschawsky, 1895 - Injected small pigs and rabbits with blood taken in the eruptive stage. All results were negative. - Belila, 1896 - Placed warm nasal mucus and saliva from measles patients on the nasal and oral mucous membrane of rabbits, guinea-pigs, cats, mice, dogs and lambs, but without any positive results. - Josias, 1898 - Rubbed measles secretions over the throat, nose and eyes of several young pigs, but without any effects. - Geissler, 1903 - Inoculated sheep, swine, goats, dogs and cats in various ways with the bodily fluids from patients with measles; including smearing, spraying, rubbing. All results were negative. - Pomjalowsky, 1914 - Injected measles blood into guineapigs, rabbits and small pigs. All results were negative. - Jurgelunas, 1914 - Inoculated blood from patients with measles into suckling pigs and rabbits, but without effect. Leegaard, 1899 - Was not able to prove a single case of patient-to-patient contagion in a polio outbreak in Norway. "Infantile paralysis is of an infectious, but not of a contagious nature. As a matter of fact no indisputable instance of contagion could be proved." Dr. Rodermund, 1901 - From his diary of SmallPox experiments. For 15 years he smeared the pus of smallpox patients on his face and used to go home with his family, play cards at the gentleman’s club and treat other patients and never got sick or saw a single other person get sick. Walter Reed, 1902 - “Without entering into details, I may say that, in the first place, the Commission saw, with some surprise, what had so often been noted in the literature, that patients in all stages of yellow fever could be cared for by non-immune nurses without danger of contracting the disease. The non-contagious character of yellow fever was, therefore, hardly to be questioned.” Landsteiner & Popper, 1909 - "Attempts to transmit the disease [polio] to the usual laboratory animals, such as rabbits, guinea pigs, or mice, failed." F.E. Batten, (1909) - “Against the infectivity of the disease may be urged, first, the absence of spread of infection in hospital. The cases of poliomyelitis admitted to hospital freely mixed with other cases in the ward without any isolation or disinfection, some 70 children came in contact, but no infection took place. (p. 208, last paragraph)” The Boston medical and surgical journal, 1909 - An inquiry a 1908 polio outbreak found the following: “A large number of children were in intimate contact with those that were sick, and of these children an insignificant minority developed the disease.” 244 children were in intimate contact with those who were afflicted with polio. Of those 244 children, an "insignificant minority" developed the disease. Massachusetts State board of health, 1909 - "Poliomyelitis prevailed in epidemic form in Kansas during the summer of 1909 … No method of contagion could be found, and the author does not consider the disease contagious." Flexner & Lewis, 1910 - Multiple unsuccessful polio transmission attempts. "Many guinea-pigs and rabbits, one horse, two calves, three goats, three pigs, three sheep, six rats, six mice, six dogs, and four cats have had active virus introduced in the brain but without causing any appreciable effect whatever. These animals have been under observation for many weeks." A Washinton, 1911 - “I have not seen any cases of Polio contagion. We put the patients on one side and typhoid cases on the other, and no nurse or mother was infected. If the disease was so contagious, I don't see why the nurses and mothers would not have been infected.” J.J. Moren, 1912 - "Monkeys suffering from polio in the same cage with healthy monkeys, do not infect others." P. H. Römer, 1913 - "No proofs of the contagiousness of the disease [polio] could be obtained in the great epidemic in New York in 1907, nor in the epidemic in the Steiermark (Furntratt, Potpeschnigg) nor in Pomerania (Peiper). H. W. Frauenthal, 1914 - "Advocates of the contagion theory were at a loss to account for the fact that spontaneous [polio] transmission among laboratory monkeys was never known to occur ... There is no proof that spontaneous transmission of acute poliomyelitis, without an inoculation wound, can take place. There is no proof that contact contagion takes place. Spontaneous development of the disease among laboratory animals is unknown." W.H. Frost, 1916 - "The disease [polio] develops in a such a small proportion of people known to have been intimately associated with acute cases of polio." ... "The majority of cases of poliomyelitis can not be traced to known contact, either direct or indirect, with any previous case." W. L. Holt, 1916 - Investigated an epidemic of polio and found that he was "surprised that I could trace hardly any cases to personal contact with others, there rarely being successive cases." Dr. I. D. Rawlings, 1916 - "Any one who has had much experience with poliomyelitis is struck by the infrequency, relatively, of the secondary cases among direct contacts ... there were approximately 1,500 direct contacts, and yet but one possible case occurred among them. Also among the large number of people that came from New York and other infected areas not a single case occurred.” H. L. Abramson, 1917 - Attempts to induce polio in a monkey by injecting the spinal fluid of 40 polio patients (rather than the ground cord) into the brain failed. Dold et al. 1917 (Original paper in German from Muenchener Medizinische Wochenschrift 64 ( 1917), bottom of p 143) - Injected healthy people with the nasal secretions taken from one ill person, 1/40 healthy people became ill. A review of the investigations concerning the etiology of measels, A. W. Sellards harvard Medical School. Boston, Massachusetts as seen below: - Jurgelunas, 1914: Tried to produce measles in monkeys using inoculations of the blood and mucus secretions from measles patients as well as by exposing the animals to patients in measles wards. All results were negative. - Sellards, 1918: Tried to transmit measles to 8 healthy volunteers without a prior history of measles exposure. 0/8 men became sick after multiple failed attempts. - Sellards and Wenworth, 1918: Inoculated 3 monkeys in various ways, including intensive injections of blood from measles patients. The animals remained well. - Sellards and Wenworth, 1918: Blood from measles patients was injected simultaneously into 2 men and 2 monkeys. Both men remained symptom-free. One of the two monkeys developed symptoms that were not suggestive of measles. Milton Rosenau, 1918 - Professor of preventive medicine and hygiene at Harvard, notes that "monkeys have so far never been known to contract the disease [polio] spontaneously, even though they are kept in intimate association with infected monkeys." Page 341. Hess & Unger, 1918 - "In three instances the nasal secretion of varicella patients was applied to the nostrils; in three others the tonsillar secretion to the tonsils, and in six, the tonsillar and pharyngeal secretions were transferred to the nose, the pharynx, and the tonsils. In none of these twelve cases was there any reaction whatsoever, either local or systemic." Hess & Unger, 1918 - The vesicle fluids from people with chickenpox was injected intravenously into 38 children. 0/38 became sick. Published in the Journal - American Medical Association, 1919 - Need Of Further Research On The Transmissibility Of Measles And Varicella. “Evidently in our experiments we do not, as we believe, pursue nature's mode of transmission; either we fail to carry over the virus, or the path of infection is quite different from what it is commonly thought to be.” Milton J. Rosenau, March 1919 - Conducted 9 separate experiments in a group of 49 healthy men, to prove contagion. In all 9 experiments, 0/49 men became sick after being exposed to sick people or the bodily fluids of sick people. More information on the Rosenau studies here. Wahl et al, 1919 - Conducted 3 separate trials on six men attempting to infect them with different strains of Influenza. Not a single person got sick. Schmidt et al, 1920 (Original paper in German here) - Conducted two controlled experiments, exposing healthy people to the bodily fluids of sick people. Of 196 people exposed to the mucous secretions of sick people, 21 (10.7%) developed colds and three developed grippe (1.5%). In the second group, of the 84 healthy people exposed to mucous secretions of sick people, five developed grippe (5.9%) and four colds (4.7%). Of forty-three controls who had been inoculated with sterile physiological salt solutions eight (18.6%) developed colds. A higher percentage of people got sick after being exposed to saline compared to those being exposed to the “virus”. Williams et al, 1921 - Tried to experimentally infect 45 healthy men with the common cold and influenza, by exposing them to mucous secretions from sick people. 0/45 became ill. Mahatma Gandhi, 1921 - "and the poison that accumulates in the system is expelled in the form of small-pox. If this view is correct, then there is absolutely no need to be afraid of small-pox" also see "This has given rise to the superstition that it is a contagious disease, and hence to the attempt to mislead the people into the belief that vaccination is an effective means of preventing it." Blanc and Caminopetros, 1922 (original paper in French here) - Material from nine cases of shingles was inoculated into the eyes, cornea, conjunctiva, skin, brain, and spinal cord of a series of animals, including rabbits, mice, sheep, pigeons, monkeys, and a dog. All results were negative. Robertson & Groves, 1924 - Exposed 100 healthy individuals to the bodily secretions from 16 different people suffering from influenza. 0 people of 100 whom they deliberately tried to infect with Influenza got sick That is because Viruses don't cause disease. Bauguess, 1924 - "A careful search of the literature does not reveal a case in which the blood from a patient having measles was injected into the blood stream of another person and produced measles." The problem of the etiology of herpes zoster, 1925 - "Many other authors report entirely negative results following the inoculation of herpes zoster material into the sacrified corneas of rabbits: Kraupa (18); Baum (19); LSwenstein (8), Teissier, Gastinel, and Reilly (20) ; Kooy (21) ; Netter and Urbain (22); Bloch and Terris (23); Simon and Scott (24); and Doerr (25). It is evident, therefore, that the results of attempts to inoculate animals with material from cases of herpes zoster must be considered at present to be inconclusive." Volney S and Chney M.D., 1928 - A study where it is clearly stated that cold is not infectious. Dochez et al, 1930 - Attempted to infect 11 men with intranasal influenza. Not a single person got sick. Most strikingly one person got very sick when he accidently found out that is what they were trying to do. His symptoms disappeared when they told him he was misinformed. L. L. Lumsden, 1935 - “Painstaking efforts were made throughout the studies to obtain all traces of transmission of the disease through personal contact, but it appears that in this outbreak in Louisville evidence of personal association between the cases of poliomyelitis, suggestive of cause and effect, was no more common than that which might have been found if histories had been taken of personal association between cases of broken bones occurring in the city in the same period.” Thomas Francis Jr et al, 1936 - Gave 23 people influenza via 3 different methods. 0 people got sick.. They gave 2 people already "suffering from colds" the influenza who also did not get sick Burnet and Lush, 1937 - 200 people given "Melbourne type" Influenza . 0 people showed any symptoms of disease. 200/0. Lumsden, 1938 - "It is quite usual in small [polio] outbreaks in rural counties for individual cases to develop in separate homes three or for miles apart without there being any evidence of direct or indirect personal contact having operated between persons afflicted." L. L Lumsden, 1938 - ”The general and usual epidemiological features of the disease [polio] all appear opposed to the hypothesis that poliomyelitis is a contagious disease spread among human beings by nose-to-nose or any other direct personal contact.” Burnet and Foley, 1940 - Attempted to experimentally infect 15 university students with influenza. The authors concluded their experiment was a failure. Thomas Francis Jr, 1940 - Gave 11 people "Epidemic Influenza" 0 people got sick. That is because viruses don't cause disease. John Toomey, 1941 - A veteran polio researcher: "no animal gets the disease from another, no matter how intimately exposed." A. R. Kendall, 1945 - “The epidemiological facts of poliomyelitis are these: … (2) A majority of cases of clinically diagnosable poliomyelitis (polioparalysis) occur sporadically, with no history of contact with previous cases. (3) Two cases of polioparalysis in one family are unusual, even though no precautions are taken to prevent cross infection. (4) Clinically diagnosable cases of poliomyelitis (polioparalysis) show little tendency to spread, even in schools or other places of public gathering. (5) Incidence of polioparalysis is no greater among doctors and nurses, in intimate contact with acute cases than it is among the civil population, even though the former are exposed freely to infection.” […] “Polioparalysis is not contagious.” E. B. Shaw & H. E. Thelander, 1949 - “The epidemiology of the disease [polio] remains obscure. There has been a tendency to depart from an early theory that the disease spreads by means of direct contact.” Albert Sabin, 1951 (inventor of the polio vaccine). "There is no evidence for the transmission of poliomyelitis by droplet nuclei." Archibald L. Hoyne, 1951 (alternative link here) - “However, in the Cook County Contagious Disease Hospital where the latter procedure has not been used there has never been a doctor, intern, nurse or any other member of the personnel who contracted poliomyelitis within a period of at least thirty-five years, nor has any patient ever developed poliomyelitis after admission to the hospital.” Ralph R. Scobey, 1951 - ”Although poliomyelitis is legally a contagious disease, which implies that it is caused by a germ or virus, every attempt has failed conclusively to prove this mandatory requirement of the public health law.” Professor of clinical pediatrics and president of the Poliomyelitis Research Institute, Syracuse, N.Y. Ralph R. Scobey, 1952 - "In addition to the failure to prove contagiousness of human poliomyelitis, it has likewise been impossible to prove contagiousness of poliomyelitis in experimental animals." Douglas Gordon et al, 1975 - This study gave 10 people English type Influenza and 10 people a placebo. The study was negative. Most telling is they admit that mild symptoms were seen in the placebo group, proving that the inoculation methods cause them. Beare et al 1980 (refer to reference 6 in the linked paper). Quote from John J Cannell, 2008 as follows - “An eighth conundrum – one not addressed by Hope-Simpson – is the surprising percentage of seronegative volunteers who either escape infection or develop only minor illness after being experimentally inoculated with a novel influenza virus.” Nancy Padian, 1996 - A study which followed 176 discordant couples (1 HIV positive and the other negative) for 10 years. These couples regularly slept together and had unprotected sex. There were no HIV transmissions from the positive partner to the negative partner during the entirety of the study. John Treanor et al, 1999 - Gave 108 people Influenza A. Only 35% recorded mild symptoms such as stuffy nose. Unfortunately 35% of the placebo control group also developed mild symptoms proving the methods of inoculation are causing them. Bridges et al, 2003 - "Our review found no human experimental studies published in the English-language literature delineating person-to-person transmission of influenza... Thus, most information on human-to-human transmission of influenza comes from studies of human inoculation with influenza virus and observational studies." The Virology Journal, 2008 - ”There were five attempts to demonstrate sick-to-well influenza transmission in the desperate days following the pandemic [1918 flu] and all were ’singularly fruitless’ … all five studies failed to support sick-to-well transmission, in spite of having numerous acutely ill influenza patients, in various stages of their illness, carefully cough, spit, and breathe on a combined total of >150 well patients.” Public Health Reports, 2010 - ”It seemed that what was acknowledged to be one of the most contagious of communicable diseases [1918 flu] could not be transferred under experimental conditions.” Jasmin S Kutter, 2018, - Our observations underscore the urgent need for new knowledge on respiratory virus transmission routes and the implementation of this knowledge in infection control guidelines to advance intervention strategies for currently circulating and newly emerging viruses and to improve public health. - There is a substantial lack of (experimental) evidence on the transmission routes of PIV (types 1–4) and HMPV. - Extensive human rhinovirus transmission experiments have not led to a widely accepted view on the transmission route [35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40]. - However, until today, results on the relative importance of droplet and aerosol transmission of influenza viruses stay inconclusive and hence, there are many reviews intensively discussing this issue [10, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50]. - Despite this, the relative importance of transmission routes of respiratory viruses is still unclear, depending on the heterogeneity of many factors like the environment (e.g. temperature and humidity), pathogen and host [5, 19]. Jonathan Van Tam, 2020 - Conducted these human trials of Flu A in 2013. 52 people were intentionally given "Flu A" and made to live in controlled conditions with 75 people. 0 people sick. 0 PCR positive. J.S. Kutter, 2021 - “Besides nasal discharge, no other signs of illness were observed in the A/H1N1 virus-positive donor and indirect recipient animals.” The animals were subsequently euthanized after the animals experienced what the scientist describe as having breathing difficulties (no further details were given to describe their condition). *Refer to Note 1. Ben Killingley, 2022 - Gave 36 people what he considered to be purified Covid Virus Intranasally. The Results: Nobody got sick. *Refer to Note 2. Notes *Note 1 - Jasmin Kutter, 2021: From the Results section: “Throat and nasal swabs were collected from the donor and indirect recipient animals on alternating days.” This on its own can lead to nasal discharge which is the only “sign of illness” that was noted in this study. *Note 2 - Ben Killingley, 2022: See the video explanation by Jamie here. Ben Killingley also conducted a study in the early 2010's in which he had inoculated people in a room with 75 others some wearing masks others as a control. Not a single person even tested PCR positive. Some links to his previous studies include a 2011, 2019 and a 2020 study. It is assumed that his latest, 2022 study, is a follow up to cover the findings of his previous findings. Some additional notes on the study referenced include: - They gave 10 people the potent nephrotoxin Remdisivir. - They measure sickness by means of a PCR test which isn't indicative of disease because it can tests positive with “asymptomatic” cases as well. - Even if you say that a runny nose after swabbing is Covid. A 50% outcome to a direct challenge of something is a negative result. It doesn't suggest causation which would need to be at least 90%. - The very methods of inoculation used during the study could cause the nasal congestion/discharge (which is their measure of whether someone is sick or not). This has been shown in previous studies. - Lastly nobody was given "regeneron" because nobody got "sick". *Note 3 - Dr Robert Willner, 1994: December 7th 1994 Hollywood Roosevelt Hotel, Greensboro, N.C., Dr Willner (a medical doctor of 40 years experience) an outspoken whistleblower of the AIDS hoax. In front of a gathering of about 30 alternative-medicine practitioners and several journalists, Willner stuck a needle in the finger of Andres, 27, a Fort Lauderdale student who says he has tested positive for HIV. Then, wincing, the 65-year-old doctor stuck himself. In 1993, Dr. Willner stunned Spain by inoculating himself with the blood of Pedro Tocino, an HIV positive hemophiliac. This demonstration of devotion to the truth and the Hippocratic Oath he took, nearly 40 years before, was reported on the front page of every major newspaper in Spain. His appearance on Spain’s most popular television show envoked a 4 to 1 response by the viewing audience in favor of his position against the “AIDS hypothesis.” When asked why he would put his life on the line to make a point, Dr. Willner replied: “I do this to put a stop to the greatest murderous fraud in medical history. By injecting myself with HIV positive blood, I am proving the point as Dr. Walter Reed did to prove the truth about yellow fever. In this way it is my hope to expose the truth about HIV in the interest of all mankind.” He tested negative multiple times. He died of a Heart attack 4 months later 15th April 1995 (yeh right, funny how these naysayers all die suddenly. Link to the presentation here. Ludicrous “Transmission” Studies The picture of virology’s ludicrousy won’t be complete without a list of studies showing the insanity of what virologists claim to be transmission of disease. This include the injection of fluids into the brains and lungs of animals and we may just include some epidemiological studies to show how these are also not proof of anything. Joe Hendry mostly put it together and the papers we have are as follows (*Please note that this section is open to comments at the moment and anyone that want to add notes or studies are free to leave a comment): Louis Pasteur, 1881 - For rabies, tried to demonstrate transmission by injecting diseased brain tissue "directly onto the surface of the brain of a healthy dog through a hole drilled into its skull." Simon Flexner and Paul A. Lewis, 1910 - Spinal cords from deceased children were ground up and emulsified to be injected into the brains of monkeys. Study explained in detail here. John F. Anderson and Joseph Goldberger, 1911 - Injected blood from a measles patient directly into the heart and brains of monkeys. Carl Tenbroeck, 1918 - A mixture of ground up rat's livers, spleens, kidneys, testicles, lungs, hearts, and brains was injected into the brains of other rats. Claus W. Jungeblut, 1931 - Ground up monkey spinal cord was injected into the brains of other monkeys. Wilson Smith, 1933 - “The infected animal is killed when showing symptoms, often at the beginning of the second temperature rise. The turbinates are scraped out, ground up with sand, and emulsified in about 20 c.cm. of equal parts of broth and saline. The emulsion is lightly centrifuged, and about 1 c.cm. of the supernatant fluid is dropped into the nostrils of another ferret.” Thomas Francis and Jr, T. P. Magill, 1935 - Ground up ferret lung tissue was injected into the brains of rabbits. Ann G. Kuttner and T'sun T'ung, 1935 - Ground up kidney and brain of a guinea pig was injected into the brain of another guinea pig. Erich Traub. April 01 1936 - Ground up mouse brain was injected into the brains of guinea pigs. Albert B. Sabin and Peter K. Olitsky, 1937 - Ground up mouse brain was injected into the brains of other mice. G. John Buddingh, 1938 - Ground up chick embryo was injected into the brains 2 or 3 day old chicks. Gilbert Dalldorf, 1939 - Ground up ferret spleens was injected into the brains of mice. Claus W. Jungeblut et al, 1942 - Ground up brain or spinal cord of paralyzed mice was injected into the brains of 13 monkeys. Henry Pinkerton and Vicente Moragues, 1942 - Ground up brain tissue from dying mice was injected into the brains of pigeons. C. Kling et al, 1942 - Injected sewage sludge into the brains and abdomen of monkeys. This convinced him that he had isolated a virus and proven that the sewer is a vehicle for polio transmission. D.M. Horstmann, 1944 - Allegedly "proved" that the feces of polio patients contained "poliovirus" by injecting fecal samples into monkeys' brains and spines. Joseph E. Smadel et al, 1945 - Ground up pigeon spleen was injected into the brains of mice. F. Sargent Cheever et al, 1949 - Ground up mouse brain was injected into the brains of rats and hamsters. Isolation Isolation has been well defined in Virus Lie - The Result of 4 Years of Study and to this day there has not been a single paper presented that could show the isolation of a virus without first contaminating the sample. This is shown in detail in the virus lie article and will not be repeated here again. One interesting point that can be captured here is all the studies showing a control test proving that the isolation method used for viruses is flawed. They can be listed as follows: John F Enders, 1954 - Under other agents isolated during the study. "A second agent was obtained from an uninoculated culture of monkey kidney cells. The cytopathic changes it induced in the unstained preparations could not be distinguished with confidence from the viruses isolated from measles." It is highlighted here. Refer to the video explanation here. Image It is further discussed in the paper that "While there is no ground for concluding that the factors in vivo (in the body) are the same as those which underlie the formation of giant cells and the nuclear disturbances in vitro (outside a living organism), the appearance of these phenomena in cultured cells is consistent with the properties that a priori might be associated with the virus of measles.” Image Rustigian et al, 1955 - This paper is described in an article by Viroliegy here (look under Rustigain in the article). Cohen et al, 1955 - This paper is also described in the same article by Viroliegy here (look under Cohen in the article). Bech and von Magnus, 1959 - This paper is also described in the same article by Viroliegy here (look under Von Magnus in the article). F Rapp et al, 1959 - This paper is described in a video by Spacebusters here. Most noteworthy is “Monkey kidney cells, however, are unsuitable for the investigations of the type reported here; Peebles et al. and Ruckle showed that monkeys, and cell cultures derived from them, are often infected with an agent serologically indistinguishable from human measles virus, which causes cytopathic changes in monkey kidney cell cultures almost identical with those caused by human measles virus.” Image Carl J. O’Hara et al, 1988 - The study demonstrated "HIV" particles in 18 out of 20 (90% of) AIDS-related lymph node enlargements but also in 13 out of 15 (88% of) non-AIDS-related enlargements. Which means that particles claimed to be HIV virions are non-specific since identical particles can be found in the majority of patients with enlarged lymph nodes not attributed to AIDS, and at no risk for developing AIDS. Refer to @Aldhissla45’s tweet here. P Gluschankof et al, 1997 - This paper described in a video here with additional notes by Jamie here. Julian W. Bess Jr., 1997 - This paper described in a video here with additional notes by Jamie here. C.A. Cassol, 2020 - This paper is described by Andrew Kaufman here as well as by Thomas Cowan here. “Unofficially” we can also add the Lanka 3 phase control experiment that can be seen here or searched for it here. A further indication of the isolation procedure fallacy is shown in a study during which the CPE becomes more well defined with the addition of specific substances. The study is as follows: Leon Caly et al, 2020 - “Following several failures to recover virions with the characteristic fringes of surface spike proteins, it was found that adding trypsin to the cell culture medium immediately improved virion morphology.” See a video explanation here. Recent Requests and Statements Further and more recent requests and statements that were sent to me by my good friend Courtenay are as follows: May 5, 2022: U.S. CDC and Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry confirmed that a search of their records failed to find any that describe anyone on Earth finding an alleged “avian influenza virus” in the bodily fluids of any diseased diseased host (animal or human) and purifying “it”… which is necessary so that “it” could be sequenced, characterized and studied with controlled experiments. This can be viewed here. May 20, 2022: Public Health Agency of Canada confirmed that they have no record of any alleged “avian influenza virus” having been found and purified from the bodily fluid/tissue/excrement of any diseased “host” on the planet (in order for “it” to be sequenced, characterized and studied with controlled experiments) by anyone, anywhere, ever. Insanely, they insist that: “Viruses” are in hosts despite their utter inability to find them there,. It’s necessary to “grow them” in non-host cells (as if “they” would grow better there than they allegedly grew in the diseased host lol). They pretend that mixing complex substances together results in purification. This can be viewed here. December 20, 2021: Public Health Agency of Canada confirmed that they have no record of any alleged “virus” having been purified from a sample taken from any diseased human on Earth, by anyone, ever, period. To be viewed here. March 11, 2022: U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry respond to a FOIA request for all studies / reports in their possession, custody or control describing the purification of any “virus” addressed by any “vaccine” on either their childhood or adult U.S. “immunization” schedule, directly from a sample taken from any diseased "host" on Earth where the sample was not first combined with any other source of genetic material. CDC/ATSDR provided 5 studies on “rotavirus” (thereby admitting they have no records for any other alleged viruses). None of these 5 studies actually describe isolation/purification of a “rotavirus” from a human. Request, response, studies to be viewed here. March 8, 2023: Italy 2020: Inside Covid’s “Ground zero” in Europe - Three years ago the Western World came to a standstill. The official Covid-19 narrative depicted a strange suddenly-super-spreading, deadlier-than-flu virus hailing from China that landed in Northern Italy. On February 20, 2020 the first alleged case of Covid-19 was discovered in the West in the Lombardy town of Codogno, Italy. Later that day the Italian government reported their first “Covid-19 death.” Dramatic media reports emerging from Northern Italy were hammered into and onto the Western psyche giving the impression there was a mysterious “super spreading” and “super lethal” novel virus galloping across the region infecting and killing scores of people. Read the rest of the report here. Conclusion The above list will be worked on over the coming years. If you think that any corrections need to be made or if you want to add additional studies, please leave a comment. Share Leave a comment https://open.substack.com/pub/dpl003/p/virology-the-damning-evidence?r=29hg4d&utm_medium=ios&utm_campaign=post

Bar-Ilan University - Why are networks stable? Researchers solve a 50-year-old puzzle: https://phys.org/news/2023-04-networks-stable-year-old-puzzle.html #Ecosystems #Biodiversity #InteractionNetworks #Networks #Heterogeneity #SystemsEngineering #DiversityStabilityParadox #Diversity #Stability #Resiliency #Ecology