Iran's New President Unlikely to Usher in a New Dawn
Too many roadblocks from the theocracy
Asia Sentinel
By: Salman Rafi Sheikh
When Iran’s newly elected president Masoud Pezeshkian made his victory speech, he pointed to the “hollow promises” that leaders in the past made but never acted upon. He emphasized himself – and his promises – as “real,” promising a new era. His 53 percent share in the vote signals a strong yearning among most Iranians for change, both in the domestic and international arenas. In fact, it was his run-off with the conservative candidate Jalili that helped balloon the voter turnout from 40 percent in the first round to almost 50 percent in the second.
In line with the public mood, Masoud also signaled his willingness to rewrite relations with the West, making some in the West see a silver lining emerging from this process. But is it emerging? Masoud’s willingness notwithstanding, he still has a very hard system to overcome. He started his political career at the national level when he was appointed in 1997 as deputy health minister in the government of President Khatami. Khatami was a known reformist who promised a strong “Islamic civil society” and a “religious democracy” but he was unable to defeat the hard-liners. In fact, Khatami was succeeded by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a well-known hard-liner.
Will Masoud’s fate be any different? Iran’s political system has the Supreme Leader as the most powerful person, who can block the president. Even the parliament can be a formidable rival to overcome, especially when it is dominated by conservatives/hard-liners. In the March 2024 elections, hardliners dominated, leading (later) President Raisi to praise the election as an “extreme blow” to the opponents of the Islamist Republic.
Therefore, the question is: Is Masoud powerful enough to override the Supreme Leader and the Parliament to practically rewrite, if not completely undo, the decades of work Iran’s various leaders did to cement the alliance with China and Russia – an alliance that continues to allow Tehran to defeat the isolation the US-led West has imposed on Iran?
The man in charge
Masoud’s abilities, to begin with, are complicated by the fact that Iran’s alliance with China and Russia has brought the Islamic Republic some useful geopolitical leverage. Today, thanks to Russia’s intervention in Syria in favor of the Assad regime, Iran has a formidable military presence beyond its borders, leading the “axis of resistance.” In many ways, Iran’s strong geopolitical role in the Middle East – Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, etc. – marks a (partial) defeat, at least in Iran’s calculation, of the Western designs to use sanctions to impose regime change in Tehran. In addition, Iran also enjoys deep economic and military ties with both China and Russia. Whereas China is investing billions in Iran, mutual military cooperation with Russia remains a cornerstone of Tehran’s “look East” policy – a policy that got consolidated, ironically though, once the US began to move away from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
The JCPOA was negotiated during the Obama administration. The Iranian side was led by Hassan Rouhani, who was ironically barred by the Guardian Council from contesting the 2024 parliamentary elections. When Donald Trump became the US president in 2016, his arrival proved fatal for the future of Iran’s ties with the West. It not only practically buried the promising JCPOA but the subsequent sanctions also prevented European states, such as France, from conducting business with Iran. Iran was going to buy several airplanes from Airbus and France’s Shell was to develop Iranian oil. Because none of this transpired, Tehran’s political economy adjusted itself vis-à-vis bidders from the East.
Therefore, even if Masoud can be imagined overcoming (formidable) domestic constraints e.g., the Supreme Leader, the conservative-dominated parliament, and the Revolutionary Guards, he does not face bright prospects in the international arena of the West.
Trump promises confrontation
In the US, Donald Trump’s political resurgence is already casting dark shadows. If he wins – and he looks likely to win at this stage – what would his second term look like, especially vis-à-vis Iran? When Trump became president in 2016, he had a moderate counterpart in Tehran. Rouhani’s presence had no impact on how the Trump administration behaved.
Trump has already stated, unequivocally, that he would join Israel in confronting Iran (regardless of who the president happens to be in Iran). With a president in the White House promising to confront, there is little left for the moderate in Iran to do much. In fact, it will only strengthen the hardliners.
How will the Europeans behave? Will they be able to devise an independent policy vis-à-vis Iran? There is little room for that. With the war in Ukraine still going on and presenting, from the European perspective, an existential crisis to Europe’s future, it means that the continent does need the US on its side to avoid (the imagined) Russian takeover of Europe. Whereas Donald Trump has also stated many times that he will bring the Russia-Ukraine war to a quick end, Europe may still not have much leverage on Trump’s Iran policy. Even with no war in Ukraine, Europe cannot afford to annoy the Trump administration with a pro-Iran policy. In fact, it may drive Trump away from NATO, a military alliance he has been unhappy with for a long time.
Masoud’s Limits
These factors seriously limit the extent to which Masoud can act on his campaign promises, which included dialogue with the West to remove sanctions. But the West, with or without Trump, is quite likely to place demands that the deep state in Tehran may not be willing to meet.
Within the wider regional context of Israel’s war on Gaza, the West’s support for Israel and Iran’s support for Hamas/Palestine, a key demand would be to demilitarize Gaza permanently. Still, this demand would cover the wider Middle East as well, where the Iran-backed militias have established a strong presence. They have one key objective: to prevent US expansion in the region and drive out its current presence. The West, as in the past, will demand a systematic de-Iranization. This is of course in addition to forcing Iran to roll back its nuclear program, which saw some upgrades during the Raisi presidency. An equally pertinent demand would also target Iran’s economic and military ties with Russia and China.
Can and will Masoud make these changes? Even if he makes any move in this direction, it most likely would require nothing less than confrontation with the Supreme Leader himself – and the army or hard-liners –who already “advised” the new president to focus on “domestic capacities” (rather than foreign policy/relations) and follow Raisi’s path.
A key limit that Masoud faces is personal. For the past several years since joining politics, he has been a low-key politician. His recent victory didn’t come on the heels of a large social mobilization threatening or challenging the regime. He may have gotten support from voters who had limited choices, but given his political and social capacity, Masoud is most likely seen as ‘manageable’ by the Supreme Leader and his close advisers and allies. Otherwise, he would not have been cleared to contest the elections.
Masoud, therefore, might seem like a pleasant shift from the conservatism associated with Raisi, but Raisi’s accidental death is far from the end of the Islamic Republic or its peculiar theocratic political system.
https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/iran-masoud-pezeshkian-unlikely-usher-new-dawn?utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web
Too many roadblocks from the theocracy
Asia Sentinel
By: Salman Rafi Sheikh
When Iran’s newly elected president Masoud Pezeshkian made his victory speech, he pointed to the “hollow promises” that leaders in the past made but never acted upon. He emphasized himself – and his promises – as “real,” promising a new era. His 53 percent share in the vote signals a strong yearning among most Iranians for change, both in the domestic and international arenas. In fact, it was his run-off with the conservative candidate Jalili that helped balloon the voter turnout from 40 percent in the first round to almost 50 percent in the second.
In line with the public mood, Masoud also signaled his willingness to rewrite relations with the West, making some in the West see a silver lining emerging from this process. But is it emerging? Masoud’s willingness notwithstanding, he still has a very hard system to overcome. He started his political career at the national level when he was appointed in 1997 as deputy health minister in the government of President Khatami. Khatami was a known reformist who promised a strong “Islamic civil society” and a “religious democracy” but he was unable to defeat the hard-liners. In fact, Khatami was succeeded by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a well-known hard-liner.
Will Masoud’s fate be any different? Iran’s political system has the Supreme Leader as the most powerful person, who can block the president. Even the parliament can be a formidable rival to overcome, especially when it is dominated by conservatives/hard-liners. In the March 2024 elections, hardliners dominated, leading (later) President Raisi to praise the election as an “extreme blow” to the opponents of the Islamist Republic.
Therefore, the question is: Is Masoud powerful enough to override the Supreme Leader and the Parliament to practically rewrite, if not completely undo, the decades of work Iran’s various leaders did to cement the alliance with China and Russia – an alliance that continues to allow Tehran to defeat the isolation the US-led West has imposed on Iran?
The man in charge
Masoud’s abilities, to begin with, are complicated by the fact that Iran’s alliance with China and Russia has brought the Islamic Republic some useful geopolitical leverage. Today, thanks to Russia’s intervention in Syria in favor of the Assad regime, Iran has a formidable military presence beyond its borders, leading the “axis of resistance.” In many ways, Iran’s strong geopolitical role in the Middle East – Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, etc. – marks a (partial) defeat, at least in Iran’s calculation, of the Western designs to use sanctions to impose regime change in Tehran. In addition, Iran also enjoys deep economic and military ties with both China and Russia. Whereas China is investing billions in Iran, mutual military cooperation with Russia remains a cornerstone of Tehran’s “look East” policy – a policy that got consolidated, ironically though, once the US began to move away from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
The JCPOA was negotiated during the Obama administration. The Iranian side was led by Hassan Rouhani, who was ironically barred by the Guardian Council from contesting the 2024 parliamentary elections. When Donald Trump became the US president in 2016, his arrival proved fatal for the future of Iran’s ties with the West. It not only practically buried the promising JCPOA but the subsequent sanctions also prevented European states, such as France, from conducting business with Iran. Iran was going to buy several airplanes from Airbus and France’s Shell was to develop Iranian oil. Because none of this transpired, Tehran’s political economy adjusted itself vis-à-vis bidders from the East.
Therefore, even if Masoud can be imagined overcoming (formidable) domestic constraints e.g., the Supreme Leader, the conservative-dominated parliament, and the Revolutionary Guards, he does not face bright prospects in the international arena of the West.
Trump promises confrontation
In the US, Donald Trump’s political resurgence is already casting dark shadows. If he wins – and he looks likely to win at this stage – what would his second term look like, especially vis-à-vis Iran? When Trump became president in 2016, he had a moderate counterpart in Tehran. Rouhani’s presence had no impact on how the Trump administration behaved.
Trump has already stated, unequivocally, that he would join Israel in confronting Iran (regardless of who the president happens to be in Iran). With a president in the White House promising to confront, there is little left for the moderate in Iran to do much. In fact, it will only strengthen the hardliners.
How will the Europeans behave? Will they be able to devise an independent policy vis-à-vis Iran? There is little room for that. With the war in Ukraine still going on and presenting, from the European perspective, an existential crisis to Europe’s future, it means that the continent does need the US on its side to avoid (the imagined) Russian takeover of Europe. Whereas Donald Trump has also stated many times that he will bring the Russia-Ukraine war to a quick end, Europe may still not have much leverage on Trump’s Iran policy. Even with no war in Ukraine, Europe cannot afford to annoy the Trump administration with a pro-Iran policy. In fact, it may drive Trump away from NATO, a military alliance he has been unhappy with for a long time.
Masoud’s Limits
These factors seriously limit the extent to which Masoud can act on his campaign promises, which included dialogue with the West to remove sanctions. But the West, with or without Trump, is quite likely to place demands that the deep state in Tehran may not be willing to meet.
Within the wider regional context of Israel’s war on Gaza, the West’s support for Israel and Iran’s support for Hamas/Palestine, a key demand would be to demilitarize Gaza permanently. Still, this demand would cover the wider Middle East as well, where the Iran-backed militias have established a strong presence. They have one key objective: to prevent US expansion in the region and drive out its current presence. The West, as in the past, will demand a systematic de-Iranization. This is of course in addition to forcing Iran to roll back its nuclear program, which saw some upgrades during the Raisi presidency. An equally pertinent demand would also target Iran’s economic and military ties with Russia and China.
Can and will Masoud make these changes? Even if he makes any move in this direction, it most likely would require nothing less than confrontation with the Supreme Leader himself – and the army or hard-liners –who already “advised” the new president to focus on “domestic capacities” (rather than foreign policy/relations) and follow Raisi’s path.
A key limit that Masoud faces is personal. For the past several years since joining politics, he has been a low-key politician. His recent victory didn’t come on the heels of a large social mobilization threatening or challenging the regime. He may have gotten support from voters who had limited choices, but given his political and social capacity, Masoud is most likely seen as ‘manageable’ by the Supreme Leader and his close advisers and allies. Otherwise, he would not have been cleared to contest the elections.
Masoud, therefore, might seem like a pleasant shift from the conservatism associated with Raisi, but Raisi’s accidental death is far from the end of the Islamic Republic or its peculiar theocratic political system.
https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/iran-masoud-pezeshkian-unlikely-usher-new-dawn?utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web
Iran's New President Unlikely to Usher in a New Dawn
Too many roadblocks from the theocracy
Asia Sentinel
By: Salman Rafi Sheikh
When Iran’s newly elected president Masoud Pezeshkian made his victory speech, he pointed to the “hollow promises” that leaders in the past made but never acted upon. He emphasized himself – and his promises – as “real,” promising a new era. His 53 percent share in the vote signals a strong yearning among most Iranians for change, both in the domestic and international arenas. In fact, it was his run-off with the conservative candidate Jalili that helped balloon the voter turnout from 40 percent in the first round to almost 50 percent in the second.
In line with the public mood, Masoud also signaled his willingness to rewrite relations with the West, making some in the West see a silver lining emerging from this process. But is it emerging? Masoud’s willingness notwithstanding, he still has a very hard system to overcome. He started his political career at the national level when he was appointed in 1997 as deputy health minister in the government of President Khatami. Khatami was a known reformist who promised a strong “Islamic civil society” and a “religious democracy” but he was unable to defeat the hard-liners. In fact, Khatami was succeeded by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a well-known hard-liner.
Will Masoud’s fate be any different? Iran’s political system has the Supreme Leader as the most powerful person, who can block the president. Even the parliament can be a formidable rival to overcome, especially when it is dominated by conservatives/hard-liners. In the March 2024 elections, hardliners dominated, leading (later) President Raisi to praise the election as an “extreme blow” to the opponents of the Islamist Republic.
Therefore, the question is: Is Masoud powerful enough to override the Supreme Leader and the Parliament to practically rewrite, if not completely undo, the decades of work Iran’s various leaders did to cement the alliance with China and Russia – an alliance that continues to allow Tehran to defeat the isolation the US-led West has imposed on Iran?
The man in charge
Masoud’s abilities, to begin with, are complicated by the fact that Iran’s alliance with China and Russia has brought the Islamic Republic some useful geopolitical leverage. Today, thanks to Russia’s intervention in Syria in favor of the Assad regime, Iran has a formidable military presence beyond its borders, leading the “axis of resistance.” In many ways, Iran’s strong geopolitical role in the Middle East – Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, etc. – marks a (partial) defeat, at least in Iran’s calculation, of the Western designs to use sanctions to impose regime change in Tehran. In addition, Iran also enjoys deep economic and military ties with both China and Russia. Whereas China is investing billions in Iran, mutual military cooperation with Russia remains a cornerstone of Tehran’s “look East” policy – a policy that got consolidated, ironically though, once the US began to move away from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
The JCPOA was negotiated during the Obama administration. The Iranian side was led by Hassan Rouhani, who was ironically barred by the Guardian Council from contesting the 2024 parliamentary elections. When Donald Trump became the US president in 2016, his arrival proved fatal for the future of Iran’s ties with the West. It not only practically buried the promising JCPOA but the subsequent sanctions also prevented European states, such as France, from conducting business with Iran. Iran was going to buy several airplanes from Airbus and France’s Shell was to develop Iranian oil. Because none of this transpired, Tehran’s political economy adjusted itself vis-à-vis bidders from the East.
Therefore, even if Masoud can be imagined overcoming (formidable) domestic constraints e.g., the Supreme Leader, the conservative-dominated parliament, and the Revolutionary Guards, he does not face bright prospects in the international arena of the West.
Trump promises confrontation
In the US, Donald Trump’s political resurgence is already casting dark shadows. If he wins – and he looks likely to win at this stage – what would his second term look like, especially vis-à-vis Iran? When Trump became president in 2016, he had a moderate counterpart in Tehran. Rouhani’s presence had no impact on how the Trump administration behaved.
Trump has already stated, unequivocally, that he would join Israel in confronting Iran (regardless of who the president happens to be in Iran). With a president in the White House promising to confront, there is little left for the moderate in Iran to do much. In fact, it will only strengthen the hardliners.
How will the Europeans behave? Will they be able to devise an independent policy vis-à-vis Iran? There is little room for that. With the war in Ukraine still going on and presenting, from the European perspective, an existential crisis to Europe’s future, it means that the continent does need the US on its side to avoid (the imagined) Russian takeover of Europe. Whereas Donald Trump has also stated many times that he will bring the Russia-Ukraine war to a quick end, Europe may still not have much leverage on Trump’s Iran policy. Even with no war in Ukraine, Europe cannot afford to annoy the Trump administration with a pro-Iran policy. In fact, it may drive Trump away from NATO, a military alliance he has been unhappy with for a long time.
Masoud’s Limits
These factors seriously limit the extent to which Masoud can act on his campaign promises, which included dialogue with the West to remove sanctions. But the West, with or without Trump, is quite likely to place demands that the deep state in Tehran may not be willing to meet.
Within the wider regional context of Israel’s war on Gaza, the West’s support for Israel and Iran’s support for Hamas/Palestine, a key demand would be to demilitarize Gaza permanently. Still, this demand would cover the wider Middle East as well, where the Iran-backed militias have established a strong presence. They have one key objective: to prevent US expansion in the region and drive out its current presence. The West, as in the past, will demand a systematic de-Iranization. This is of course in addition to forcing Iran to roll back its nuclear program, which saw some upgrades during the Raisi presidency. An equally pertinent demand would also target Iran’s economic and military ties with Russia and China.
Can and will Masoud make these changes? Even if he makes any move in this direction, it most likely would require nothing less than confrontation with the Supreme Leader himself – and the army or hard-liners –who already “advised” the new president to focus on “domestic capacities” (rather than foreign policy/relations) and follow Raisi’s path.
A key limit that Masoud faces is personal. For the past several years since joining politics, he has been a low-key politician. His recent victory didn’t come on the heels of a large social mobilization threatening or challenging the regime. He may have gotten support from voters who had limited choices, but given his political and social capacity, Masoud is most likely seen as ‘manageable’ by the Supreme Leader and his close advisers and allies. Otherwise, he would not have been cleared to contest the elections.
Masoud, therefore, might seem like a pleasant shift from the conservatism associated with Raisi, but Raisi’s accidental death is far from the end of the Islamic Republic or its peculiar theocratic political system.
https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/iran-masoud-pezeshkian-unlikely-usher-new-dawn?utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web
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